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Initial research suggested that the amygdala is specifically involved in detecting threatening stimuli (Isenberg et
al., 1999; LeDoux, 2000; Morris et al., 1996), or is more
generally engaged in processing negativity (Cunningham,
Johnson, Gatenby, Gore, & Banaji, 2003; Hariri, Tessitore,
Mattay, Fera, & Weinberger, 2002). This valence-specific
conceptualization has been called into question by studies
showing that positive, like negative, stimuli evoke greater
amygdala activity than neutral stimuli (Breiter et al., 2003;
Hamann, Ely, Hoffman, & Kilts, 2002). Moreover, studies
that have independently manipulated valence and intensity
(Anderson et al., 2003; Small et al., 2003), or used statistical methods to separate the contributions of the two (Cunningham, Raye, & Johnson, 2004), have provided evidence
that amygdala activity appears to be more associated with
processing affective intensity than with processing any particular valence. These studies have been critical in reconceptualizing amygdala function from one of threat detection to one of more general vigilance for motivationally
relevant stimuli (Anderson & Phelps, 2001; Whalen, 1998).
Although it is clear that the amygdala plays an important role in automatically processing stimuli (Morris, Öhman, & Dolan, 1998; Whalen et al., 1998), other research
has shown that it is also influenced by top-down processes,
such as self-regulation (Beauregard, Levesque, & Bourgouin, 2001; Cunningham, Johnson, et al., 2004), verbal
task demands (Hariri et al., 2002; Lieberman et al., 2007),
and attention (Pessoa, Japee, Sturman, & Ungerleider,
2006). For example, research has shown that participants
given the goal to “increase” or “decrease” their emotional
response can regulate their amygdala activation in response
to emotional stimuli (Ochsner et al., 2004).
This research demonstrating the top-down modulation of
amygdala activity suggests that a fit between current processing goals and evaluative aspects of stimuli may lead to enhanced amygdala activity—what we call affective flexibility. In
this context, a fit occurs when the valence of a stimulus is

Abstract
Although early research implicated the amygdala in automatic
processing of negative information, more recent research suggests that it plays a more general role in processing the motivational relevance of various stimuli, suggesting that the relation
between valence and amygdala activation may depend on contextual goals. This study provides experimental evidence that the
relation between valence and amygdala activity is dynamically
modulated by evaluative goals. During functional magnetic resonance imaging, participants evaluated the positive, negative, or
overall (positive plus negative) aspects of famous people. When
participants were providing overall evaluations, both positive and
negative names were associated with amygdala activation. When
they were evaluating positivity, positive names were associated
with amygdala activity, and when they were evaluating negativity, negative names were associated with amygdala activity. Evidence for a negativity bias was found; modulation was more pronounced for positive than for negative information. These data
suggest that the amygdala flexibly processes motivationally relevant evaluative information in accordance with current processing goals, but processes negative information less flexibly than
positive information.

Successfully navigating complex environments requires
quick evaluative processes to determine the relative value
of stimuli in the context of situational demands. Recent research has begun to illustrate the important cognitive and
affective neural processes involved in disambiguating the
evaluative connotations of stimuli and preparing the body
for action. Convergent evidence across methodologies suggests that the amygdala is particularly relevant for encoding
and processing the affective properties of stimuli (Adolphs,
Tranel, & Damasio, 1998; Canli, Zhao, Brewer, Gabrieli,
& Cahill, 2000; LeDoux, 2000). Although it is clear that
the amygdala plays an important role in evaluation (Cunningham, Raye, & Johnson, 2004), decision making (Hsu,
Bhatt, Adolphs, Tranel, & Camerer, 2005), and social cognition (Adolphs, 2003), the precise operating characteristics of this region remain unclear.
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consistent with a processing goal. A recent study consistent
with this idea found that participants who reported having
more promotion-focused goals (sensitivity to gains) showed
greater amygdala activation in response to increasingly positive stimuli, whereas participants who reported having
more prevention-focused goals (sensitivity to losses) showed
greater amygdala activation in response to increasingly negative stimuli (Cunningham, Raye, & Johnson, 2005). It is important to note that these relationships were observed when
participants made explicit evaluative (e.g., good/bad) judgments, but not when they made nonevaluative (abstract/
concrete) judgments. Similarly, patients with anxiety disorders show heightened amygdala responses to threatening
stimuli, compared with control participants (Bishop, Duncan, & Lawrence, 2004). Although these studies were correlational and therefore do not provide causal evidence, they
suggest that goals may play a role in shaping the amygdala
response to evaluative information.
In the present study, we manipulated processing goals
to test the flexibility of amygdala processing. Specifically,
during functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI),
participants were given three different processing goals
that involved rating famous people. In the attitude condition, participants used a bivalent scale to indicate their
overall attitude toward each name. In the other two conditions, participants provided univalent evaluative ratings;
they rated only the positive aspects of each name (i.e.,
“how positive is your response ignoring anything negative?”; scale from none to very good) in the positive condition,
and they rated only the negative aspects (scale from none
to very bad) in the negative condition. Thus, in the attitude
condition, both positive and negative aspects of each name
were relevant to the processing goal, whereas in the positive and negative conditions, only positive or only negative aspects of each name, respectively, were relevant. To
the extent that the amygdala is engaged in processing aspects of stimuli that fit the current processing goal, stimulus extremity should be associated with activation when
overall attitudes are rated (i.e., more extreme positive and
negative names were expected to be associated with greater
amygdala activation), whereas positive or negative stimuli,
respectively, should be associated with enhanced amygdala
activation when only positive or only negative aspects of
the stimuli are rated (e.g., in the positive condition, names
rated as more positive were expected to be associated with
greater amygdala activation).
Method
Participants
Sixteen right-handed participants (12 females, 4 males;
mean age = 22.8 years) provided informed consent and
were paid $50 for completing the study. Two participants
were excluded because of head motion greater than 2 mm
in any direction, and 2 participants were excluded for
knowing less than 75% of the names. Twelve participants
remained for analyses.
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Procedure
Participants completed eight functional runs, each consisting of three 12-trial blocks. On each trial, participants
provided one of three types of evaluative judgments about
a famous name. On attitude trials, participants evaluated each name on a 4-point scale from strongly negative to
strongly positive. On negative trials, participants evaluated
only negative aspects of the name, using a 4-point scale
from none to very bad. On positive trials, participants evaluated only positive aspects of the name, using a 4-point
scale from none to very good. To help create and maintain
evaluative goals, we grouped the trials so that the same
evaluative judgment was required for all faces within each
block. Each of 96 names (e.g., Adolph Hitler, Paris Hilton,
Mother Teresa, George Clooney) was rated once in each
condition.
Before each block, a direction screen was presented for
4 s to inform participants of the evaluative judgment required for the following 12 trials. The direction screen was
followed by a fixation cross for 4 s. Then, each name appeared for 2 s, during which time participants made a response with a four-button response box placed in their right
hand. To allow for the estimation of the event-related hemodynamic signal, we presented a 2-s, 4-s, or 6-s fixation
cross after each name; the duration of the cross was pseudorandomly determined. Following fMRI scanning, participants completed a questionnaire on which they rated each
of the names on the dimensions of positivity, negativity,
and emotionality (i.e., how “emotional” the stimulus made
them feel); the scales ranged from 1 (low) to 8 (high). Participants also indicated names they did not know.
fMRI Parameters
All imaging was conducted with a Siemens 3-T scanner.
For whole-brain functional coverage, 32 axial slices (slice
thickness = 3.5 mm, 0.5-mm skip) were prescribed parallel to the anterior commissure–posterior commissure line.
Functional images were acquired using a single-shot gradient echo-planar pulse sequence (echo time = 25 ms, repetition time = 2 s, in-plane resolution = 3.5 × 3.5 mm, matrix
size: 64 × 64, field of view = 224 mm).
fMRI Preprocessing and Analysis
Data were prepared for analysis using FSL (University of
Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom) and SPM5 (Wellcome
Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, United Kingdom). Data were first corrected for slice-acquisition time,
motion, and high-frequency noise using FSL default settings. Data were then transformed to conform to the default
EPI Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) brain interpolated to 3 × 3 × 3 mm and were smoothed using an 8-mm
full-width/half-maximum kernel in SPM5. Because we employed a blocked event-related design, a high-pass filter of
160 s was used to retain meaningful signal.
Data were analyzed using the general linear model as implemented in SPM5. In each analysis, a series of regressors was constructed to examine
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Postscan Ratings
					
					
Rating

Mean

SD

Minimum

Measured variables
Positivity
Negativity
Emotionality
Calculated variables
Valence (V)
Ambivalence

Maximum

4.07
3.61
3.83

2.10
2.32
1.85

1.00
1.00
1.08

7.92
8.00
7.67

0.46
0.75

4.06
4.05

–7.00
–5.17

6.92
9.17

Correlations
among ratings
Positivity

–.69
.18

Negativity

.21

The calculated variables are linear transformations of the positivity and negativity ratings.

blood-oxygenation-level-dependent (BOLD) brain activity for each of the trial types. The BOLD signal was modeled as a function of a canonical hemodynamic response
function. For amygdala analyses, an anatomical mask was
created, and significant voxels were defined as those exceeding a statistical threshold of p < .05 (small-volume corrected, with 10 contiguous voxels). For whole-brain analyses, significant voxels were defined as those exceeding a
statistical threshold of p < .001 (uncorrected, with 10 contiguous voxels). A statistical threshold of p < .05 (uncorrected) was used to explore data from regions of interest
extracted from other analyses.
Results
Rather than separating our data according to names
rated as more positive than negative and names rated as
more negative than positive, we conducted a series of regression analyses in which the continuous postscan ratings were regressed against fMRI data to test for linear
and nonlinear trends. The mean ratings for negativity (M =
3.61, SD = 2.32) and positivity (M = 4.07, SD = 2.10) were
similar, as were the correlations between ratings of positivity and emotionality (r = .18) and ratings of negativity and
emotionality (r = .21; see Table 1).
To examine the relation between postscan attitude ratings and amygdala activity, we computed valence (V)
scores from the postscan ratings of each name by subtracting each participant’s negativity rating from his or her positivity rating; higher scores represented more positive overall evaluations. BOLD activity for each participant and
each trial was then predicted as a function of V and V2 (the
quadratic term). Because V was zero-centered, V2 represented the extremity of the ratings of positivity or negativity (i.e., highly negative and highly positive stimuli would
both receive a high score). Rated emotionality was used as

a covariate to ensure that the effect of valence could not
be attributed to generalized emotionality. Because values
of V close to zero could reflect either no valence or a mix
of positivity and negativity, we included an index of ambivalence (having both positive and negative responses;
Thompson, Zanna, & Griffin, 1995) as a covariate.1 Unknown names were modeled using separate regressors, so
the reported analyses are based on known names (91% on
average). To test for differences between experimental conditions, we modeled each of these parameters separately
for each condition.
Affective Flexibility in the Amygdala
Analyses of amygdala activation were conducted using
an anatomical mask generated in MRIcro (Rorden & Brett,
2000). Results were consistent with recent research linking
stimulus intensity to amygdala activity; an overall effect of
extremity (V2) was found bilaterally—right amygdala: t(11)
= 5.76, p < .0001, prep > .99; left amygdala: t(11) = 5.31, p
< .0001, prep > .99 (see Figure 1, top panel). This effect was
not moderated by experimental condition, F(2, 22) = 0.70,
p = .51, prep = .50, and was significant in each condition (ps
< .05, preps > .88). There was no main effect of valence on
amygdala activity, t(11) = 0.11, p = .91, prep = .17.
To examine whether amygdala activity was flexibly related to stimulus aspects that fit the current processing
goal, we analyzed the valence-by-condition interaction.
The results were consistent with the idea of affective flexibility; the effect of valence on amygdala activity differed
across experimental conditions—right amygdala: F(2, 22)
= 11.07, p < .001, prep = .99; left amygdala: F(2, 22) = 9.44,
p < .001, prep = .99 (see Figure 1, bottom panel). To be conservative in identifying regions of the amygdala engaged
in processing the motivational relevance of stimuli, we decomposed these effects by extracting the overlapping significant voxels from the preceding analyses of the effects of

1. Ambivalence was computed for each stimulus for each participant using standard equations. These equations take into consideration both the conflict
between positive and negative information (C, the minimum of the two ratings for a given stimulus) and the strength of the dominant response (D, the
maximum of the two ratings). Because C contributes more to ambivalence than D and is in the opposite direction, ambivalence was computed as 3C −
D (see Thompson et al., 1995).
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Figure 1. Significant activations in the amygdala region of interest. The planes from which these coronal maps were taken are shown in
the illustrations on the right. The maps on the top show areas exhibiting a significant overall effect of stimulus extremity (V2), and the
maps on the bottom show areas exhibiting a significant interaction of valence and condition.

valence and extremity. Analysis of these voxels revealed a
significant relation between valence and amygdala activity
in the positive condition (M = 0.05), t(11) = 2.06, p < .05,
prep = .91, and the negative condition (M = −0.06), t(11)
= −2.36, p < .05, prep = .93, but not in the attitude condition (M = 0.01), t(11) = 0.09, p = .46, prep = .53. The effect
of valence was reversed for the positive and negative conditions; in each case, the most amygdala activity was found
for stimulus aspects that fit the current processing goal.
This pattern implicates the amygdala in tracking the fit
between processing goals and evaluative aspects of stimuli within the environment. To further elucidate these effects, we used the beta weights generated for V and V2 in
the previous analysis to estimate expected amygdala activity at each level of valence for each experimental condition (see Figure 2). Results for the attitude condition replicated previous work: Amygdala activity increased for both
increasingly positive and increasingly negative names. Although there was evidence of affective flexibility for both
the positive and the negative conditions, the pattern of data
suggested a negativity bias (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994),
in which negative information was weighted more heavily

than positive information.2 Specifically, in the negative
condition, greater activity was found for increasingly negative names, and almost no activity was found for positive
names. In contrast, in the positive condition, activity was
found for both positive and negative names (though the activity in response to negative names was less than in the
negative and attitude conditions).3
Separating Positive and Negative Aspects
Recent models of evaluation suggest that the processing
of valence can be subdivided into the processing of positivity and negativity (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994). The previous analysis suggests that affective flexibility may be asymmetric, such that the effect of the fit between valence and
processing goal on amygdala activity is more pronounced
for positive than for negative information. To provide a
more direct test of this possibility, we analyzed the data by
estimating separate parameters for positive and negative aspects of each name. Specifically, we modeled BOLD activity as a function of postscan positivity ratings, postscan
negativity ratings, the positivity-by-negativity interaction,
and emotionality. For the regression analyses, the positivity

2. The measures in Table 1 indicate that it is unlikely that reported effects can be attributed to differences in extremity of the stimuli. Further, we analyzed
the data using simultaneous regression analysis with ratings as continuous variables, and this approach also makes it unlikely for the significant results
obtained to be due to differences in extremity.
3. Although we report direct evidence for this asymmetry in the next section, initial evidence for a negativity bias can be found by comparing predicted
activity in the positive and negative conditions with predicted activity in the attitude condition. Whereas the difference between the predicted activity
in response to positive stimuli in the negative condition and in the attitude condition was significant, t(11) = 2.27, p < .05, prep = .88, there was no difference between predicted activity in response to negative stimuli in the positive condition and in the attitude condition, t(11) = 0.79, p = .45, prep = .54.
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Figure 2. Predicted bilateral amygdala activity as a function of
stimulus valence and condition. Bilateral amygdala activity is
plotted as the score predicted from the postscan valence (V) and
quadratic valence (V2) beta terms as determined by ratings in
each of the three conditions.

Figure 3. Beta weights associated with bilateral amygdala activity as a function of independent postscan ratings of positivity and
negativity, graphed separately for the positive and negative conditions during scanning.

and negativity ratings were centered to allow for a meaningful interaction term. To extract voxels for the secondlevel analysis, we generated from the previous analyses a
mask that contained the significant voxels for both the extremity and the fit effects. By analyzing only these voxels,
we were able to make direct comparisons between the two
sets of analyses.
Results were consistent with the idea of affective flexibility. There was a significant interaction between scanning condition (positive or negative) and stimulus valence (postscan ratings of positivity or negativity), F(1,
11) = 9.67, p < .01, prep = .95 (see Figure 3). More positively rated names were associated with more amygdala
activity in the positive condition and less amygdala activity in the negative condition. Further, more negatively
rated names were associated with greater amygdala activity in the negative condition, but were unrelated to amygdala activity in the positive condition. The graph in Figure 3 further illustrates the heightened amygdala activity
in response to positive stimuli in the positive condition
and the offset of the extremity effect (V2) in the negative
condition. In other words, the effects illustrated in Figure 3 can be understood as modulations of the extremity effect, in which positivity and negativity are both associated with increased amygdala activity. When there was
a fit between stimulus valence and task, the extremity effect was enhanced (i.e., positive beta weights). However,
when there was a mismatch, the extremity effect was not
altered for negative stimuli in the positive condition, but
was significantly reduced for positive stimuli in the negative condition (i.e., negative beta weight). Indeed, the latter reduction was sufficient to completely eliminate the
extremity effect, as Figure 2 shows. Figure 3, like Figure
2, shows evidence of a negativity bias. The beta weights

for negativity ratings suggest that although it is possible to
increase the processing of negative information, it may be
more difficult to decrease the processing of negative information—even when the information is unrelated to current goals.
Affective Flexibility in Other Brain Regions
Whole-brain analyses were conducted to identify other
regions showing affective flexibility in the form of enhanced activity when there was a fit between valence and
goals. For these analyses, we defined significant regions
of activity as those in which the regression parameter estimates were larger for fit associations (e.g., relation between
stimulus positivity and activity in the positive condition)
than nonfit associations (e.g., relation between stimulus
negativity and activity in the positive condition). In addition to identifying the amygdala, this analysis identified
several other regions previously implicated in emotional or
reward processing, such as right and left insula (Critchley,
Wiens, Rotshtein, Öhman, & Dolan, 2004; Barrett & Wager, in press), t(11) = 4.16, p < .001, prep = .99, and t(11) =
4.29, p < .001, prep = .99, respectively, and left nucleus accumbens (Knutson, Adams, Fong, & Hommer, 2001), t(11)
= 3.73, p < .001, prep = .99. These results suggest that a
widespread network of brain regions is involved in processing motivational relevance.
Prefrontal Contributions to Affective Flexibility
We expected that not only regions typically associated
with affective processing, but also regions associated with
executive function and emotion regulation might be involved in guiding affective flexibility. Having to selectively
process a subset of information to determine the affective
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connotations of a stimulus may require deliberate attention
and selective processing. Evidence for this would be found
if regions associated with executive function either had
greater overall activity in the positive and negative conditions than in the attitude condition or were shown to have
greater connectivity with the amygdala in the positive and
negative conditions than in the attitude condition. In addition, executive function may play a particularly active
role when participants’ processing goal is to attend to either positive or negative aspects of stimuli and both positive and negative information are present (ambivalence).
In these cases, the presence of goal-relevant information
would activate additional processing, and relevant information would need to be foregrounded from goal-irrelevant (and in this case conflicting) information to make an
appropriate judgment.
Whole-brain analyses of the main effect of condition
and the ambivalence-by-condition interaction provided
evidence for both hypotheses. Right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) differentiated conditions in the main-effects analysis, showing greater activation in the positive
and negative conditions than in the attitude condition,
t(11) = 3.02, p < .01, prep = .96 (MNI coordinates: 42, 33,
42), although this effect was significant at a slightly more
lenient threshold than used in the other analyses. This
finding was bolstered by an independent components
analysis that we used to examine connectivity (Calhoun,
Adali, Pearlson, & Pekar, 2001). Of the 25 components
extracted, 2 contained both amygdala and prefrontal correlations. The first suggested a network that also included
both medial areas of orbitofrontal cortex, t(11) = 5.92, p
< .001, prep = .99 (MNI coordinates: −3, 27, −24), and
right lateral areas of orbitofrontal cortex, t(11) = 4.25, p
< .001, prep = .99 (MNI coordinates: 39, 39, −12), as well
as a large area of right rostrolateral PFC, t(11) = 3.68, p <
.001, prep = .99 (MNI coordinates: 24, 69, 12). The second
network included right orbitofrontal cortex, t(11) = 4.61,
p < .001, prep = .99 (MNI coordinates: 45, 57, −9); left orbitofrontal cortex, t(11) = 7.17, p < .001, prep = .99 (MNI
coordinates: −36, 54, −12); and anterior cingulate, t(11)
= 4.35, p < .001, prep = .99 (MNI coordinates: 12, 24, 27).
We conducted a test of differences in connectivity by regressing the time courses of these 2 components from the
expected hemodynamic signals from the three conditions.
These analyses indicated that both components were significantly more present in the positive and negative conditions than in the attitude condition—first component:
t(11) = 2.29, p < .05, prep = .88; second component: t(11)
= 3.47, p < .001, prep = .99.
In addition, the condition-by-ambivalence interaction
indicated that several regions were more associated with
ambivalence in the positive and negative conditions than
in the attitude condition. These regions included several
areas associated with executive function and the foregrounding or backgrounding of information (Cunningham & Zelazo, 2007; Miller, 2000), such as ventrolateral
PFC, t(11) = 5.14, p < .001, prep = .99 (MNI coordinates:
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−36, 27, −18), and rostrolateral PFC, t(11) = 4.75, p <
.001, prep = .99 (MNI coordinates: 24, 66, 18). The activations in lateral PFC suggest that additional processing
was required for ambivalent stimuli. A regression analysis (repeated within subjects) revealed that more ambivalent names were associated with longer in-scanner reaction times (β = .15, p < .001, prep > .99). Taken together,
these results suggest that a simple goal state was likely insufficient for processing ambivalence in the positive and
negative conditions, and that lateral PFC regions were recruited to resolve the conflict in rendering an evaluation,
perhaps by foregrounding relevant aspects of stimuli over
irrelevant aspects.
Results of the region-of-interest and whole-brain analyses are summarized in Table 2.
Discussion
The present study demonstrates a new degree of processing flexibility within the human amygdala. These data
suggest that the amygdala may play a relatively flexible role
in evaluation, processing stimulus aspects in accordance
with current goals and motivations. Specifically, activity in
the amygdala tracked the fit between experimentally manipulated evaluative goals and the valence of target stimuli.
The amygdala was most active when participants evaluated (a) positive stimuli in the positive condition, (b) negative stimuli in the negative condition, and (c) both positive
and negative stimuli in the attitude condition. Although
the “default” mode of amygdala activation may be to process affective intensity or extremity (positive or negative information could be equally important)—which serves an
important vigilance function (Davis & Whalen, 2001)—
these data suggest that the amygdala, in concert with other
neural components of evaluative processing, may track and
process the fit between stimuli and situational demands.
Although these data provide an important demonstration of affective flexibility in the amygdala, it is important to
consider the asymmetry in evaluative processing. Whereas
the amygdala was relatively unresponsive to positive names
in the negative condition (Figure 2 shows a nearly flat line
of amygdala activity for such names), some residual activation in the amygdala was observed for negative names in the
positive condition. Further evidence of this negativity bias
(Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001) was obtained from the analysis in which we separated the independent positive and negative ratings of each stimulus. Whereas
the processing of positive information was associated with
increased amygdala activity in the positive condition and decreased amygdala activity in the negative condition (offsetting the extremity effect), processing negative information
only increased amygdala activity in the negative condition.
Compared with positive information, negative information
may not have been as easily inhibited when it was task irrelevant. These results suggest an important constraint on the affective flexibility of the amygdala.
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Table 2. Areas Exhibiting Significant Blood-Oxygen-Level-Dependent (BOLD) Activation
			
Area
BA
Hemisphere
Amygdala
Amygdala

t or F
statistic

x

MNI coordinates
y

z

Areas associated with valence extremity (collapsing across conditions): region-of-interest analysis
—
Right
5.76
21
0
–21
—
Left
5.31
–18
6
–15

Areas associated with valence extremity (collapsing across conditions): whole-brain analysis
Amygdala
—
Right
5.76
21
0
–21
Amygdala
—
Left
5.31
–18
6
–15
Anterior cingulate
32
Left
6.90
–3
42
9
Parahippocampal gyrus
20/30
Left
7.62
–30
–27
–21
Middle temporal gyrus
20
Left
6.67
–63
–18
–24
Inferior temporal gyrus
37
Left
7.40
–51
–57
–18
Inferior parietal gyrus
40
Left
9.60
–60
–45
45
Amygdala
Amygdala

Areas associated with a significant valence-by-condition effect (affective fit): region-of-interest analysis
—
Right
11.07
21
0
–12
—
Left
9.44
–24
–3
–15

Areas associated with a significant valence-by-condition effect (affective fit): whole-brain analysis
Amygdala
—
Right
4.46
21
0
–12
Amygdala
—
Left
4.29
–24
0
–15
Insula
48
Right
4.16
45
0
6
Insula
48
Left
4.78
–42
0
9
Precentral gyrus
6
Left
4.59
–36
–12
60
Precentral gyrus
6
Right
4.38
27
–12
66
Supramarginal gyrus
48
Right
4.57
63
–21
27

No. of voxels
34
15
32
15
90
56
45
117
165
26
40
13
28
16
36
40
16
26

Areas exhibiting greater activity in the positive and negative conditions than in the attitude condition: whole-brain analysis
Lateral orbital frontal cortex (VLPFC) 47
Right
5.14
–36
27
–18
34
Superior frontal gyrus (RLPFC)
10
Left
4.75
24
66
18
49
Superior frontal gyrus
8
Left
5.88
3
30
63
167
Middle frontal gyrus
9
Right
4.74
–39
27
48
10
Angular gyrus
48
Left
4.86
51
–42
30
64
Angular gyrus
39
Right
4.18
–60
–54
36
43
Inferior occipital gyrus
19
Left
5.15
45
–72
–15
40
Calcarine fissure
17
—
3.83
0
–72
12
11
In the region-of-interest analyses (small-volume-corrected p < .05) and whole-brain analyses (p < .001), identified regions had to
meet a threshold of activity in 10 or more contiguous voxels. Regions are identified by Brodmann’s areas (BA) and Montreal
Neurological Institute (MNI) coordinates (x, y, z). RLPFC 5 rostrolateral prefrontal cortex; VLPFC 5 ventrolateral prefrontal cortex.

In addition, the current study provides insights into the
processes of emotional regulation. Although there were differences in PFC activation and connectivity with the amygdala between conditions, there was a stronger interaction between ambivalence and condition, which suggests that the
shifts in affective processing (Ochsner & Gross, 2007) may
result from PFC-mediated processes. PFC regions may
maintain the goal and trigger processes when stimuli are too
complex (ambivalent) for the current processing goal (i.e., in
the positive and negative conditions). For ambivalent stimuli, the recruitment of additional PFC-mediated control processes may have been necessary to foreground relevant valenced information so that an appropriate evaluation could
be rendered (Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2004).

One possible interpretation of these data is that the
amygdala itself filters information on the basis of motivational significance. An alternative possibility is that topdown attentional processes foreground motivationally relevant information, which is then processed by the amygdala
(Anderson et al., 2003; Pessoa et al., 2006). It is likely that
such processes came into play in our task, as word meaning needs to be extracted prior to affective processing, and
different memories may contribute to different evaluations.
Thus, the observed modulation may have come from the
inputs to the amygdala, rather than from differences in processing within the amygdala proper. According to this account, processing was not changed; rather, the afferents
were altered.

Affective Flexibility

and

A m y g da l a A c t i v i t y

It is becoming increasingly clear that evaluation is remarkably complex and dependent on the integration of
existing stimulus-based attitudes with current goals, motivations, and contextual demands (Cunningham &
Zelazo, 2007; Ferguson & Bargh, 2004). Although amygdala processing has been shown to occur rapidly and unconsciously, these data add to the growing evidence that
goals may modulate amygdala activation to generate contextually appropriate and nuanced evaluations (Kim et al.,
2004). Although complex neural networks play an important role in rendering an evaluation, we suggest that flexibility may be a core operating characteristic of specific
components within these networks. Specifically, the amygdala may respond flexibly to the valence and extremity of
stimuli in a goal-congruent fashion, but process negativity
in a less flexible fashion than positivity. This combination
of flexible and fixed processing may allow humans to solve
new and old evaluative problems while successfully navigating complex environments.
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